It is unlikely that event log data would be cleared during normal operations, and it is likely that malicious attackers may try to cover their tracks by clearing an event log. When an event log gets cleared, it is suspicious. Alerting when a “Clear Event Log” is generated could point to this intruder technique. Centrally collecting events has the added benefit of making it much harder for attackers to cover their tracks. Event Forwarding permits sources to forward multiple copies of a collected event to multiple collectors, thus enabling redundant event collection. Using a redundant event collection model can minimize the single point of failure risk.
|Technique||Subtechnique(s)||Tactic(s)||Level of Coverage|
|Indicator Removal on Host||Clear Windows Event Logs||Defense Evasion||Moderate|
|D3-RTA||RPC Traffic Analysis|
When an eventlog is cleared, a new event is created that alerts that the eventlog was cleared. For Security logs, its event code 1100 and 1102. For System logs, it is event code 104.
([log_name] == "Security" and [event_code] in [1100, 1102]) or ([log_name] == "System" and [event_code] == 104)
Sigma rule (System log) (Sigma)
Sigma version of the above pseudocode, focusing only on the System log.
Sigma rule (Security log) (Sigma)
Sigma version of the above pseudocode, focusing only on the Security log.
LogPoint version of the above pseudocode.
norm_id=WinServer ((channel="Security" event_id IN [1100,1102]) OR (channel="System" event_id=104))
Test Case 1
Configurations: Windows 7
You can use the powershell cmdlet “Clear-Eventlog” to clear event logs. Open Powershell as administrator and execute Clear-Eventlog
Clear-EventLog [-LogName] \<String\>. Additional information here.
Clear-Eventlog Security Clear-Eventlog System